Seattle Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. And it has its roots in preventing what gradually may become the de facto resegregation of Americas public schools. Id., at 3839, 82. As counsel who appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs in Brown put it: We have one fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens. Tr. First, the histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards to resist racial segregation in public schools. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit originally reversed, 285 F. 3d 1236 (9th Cir. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). Unlike todays decision, they were also entirely loyal to Brown. The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admissions program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a particular racial group. 1, 458 U. S. 457, is directly on point. in No. The dissent refers to an opinion filed by Judge Kozinski in one of the cases now before us, and that opinion relied upon an opinion filed by Chief Judge Boudin in a case presenting an issue similar to the one here. at 17. Fifty-three of the 125 studied districts used transfers as a component of their plans. 1 a decision affirming the goal of integrated education as a compelling interest but rejecting the means many school districts use to maintain some integration in a rapidly resegregating society. It is not up to the school boardsthe very government entities whose race-based practices we must strictly scrutinizeto determine what interests qualify as compelling under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the next decade, annual program transfers remained at approximately this level. The decision was a 5-4 split on the Court, with both sides claiming that their position was truest to the precedent set in Brown v. Because the referendum would have prohibited the adoption of a school-integration plan that involved mandatory busing, and because it would have imposed a special burden on school integration plans (plans that sought to integrate previously segregated schools), the Court found it unconstitutional. Between 80% and 90% of all students received their first choice assignment; between 89% and 97% received their first or second choice assignment. In both cities plaintiffs filed lawsuits claiming unconstitutional segregation. of Oral Arg. The district, nevertheless, has failed to make an adequate showing in at least one respect. into account. Adarand, supra, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). The student could then choose among those schools, indicating a first choice, and other choices the student found acceptable. In the immediate aftermath of Brown the Court addressed other instances where laws and practices enforced de jure segregation. As these programs demonstrate, every time the government uses racial criteria to bring the races together, post, at 29, someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his or her race. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 27071. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). In Board of Ed. of Oral Arg. To Crawford? Second, "the interest in diversity in higher education", as upheld in, This page was last edited on 5 February 2023, at 17:43. W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of the River 118 (1998) (hereinafter Bowen & Bok). Similarly, of the 1,461 black students enrolled in the 12 senior high schools in Seattle, 1,151 (or 78.8%) attended 3 senior high schools, and 900 (61.6%) attended a single school, Garfield. And if Seattle School Dist. Applying a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored, because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point. App. Louisville's population is about 58% White; 38% Black, 2% Asian, 1.3% Hispanic. Supporting the school boards, one amicus has assured us that both early desegregation research and recent statistical and econometric analyses indicate that there are positive effects on minority student achievement scores arising from diverse school settings. Brief for American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae 10. in No. Id. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. Indeed, the consequences of the approach the Court takes today are serious. The same principles guide todays decision. See, e.g., App. PICS argues, however, that the Seattle School District is doing just thatemploying racial balancing for the sole purpose of achieving racial diversity in its individual schools. Are courts really to treat as merely de facto segregated those school districts that avoided a federal order by voluntarily complying with Browns requirements? The districts argue that other factors, such as student preferences, affect assignment decisions under their plans, but under each plan when race comes into play, it is decisive by itself. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle. The State Supreme Court wrote: Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Id., at 42, 678 A. This context is not a context that involves the use of race to decide who will receive goods or services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and which are in short supply. But that length is necessary. These changes conformed with the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy. Sociological Rev., No. Contrary to the dissents arguments, resegregation is not occurring in Seattle or Louisville; these school boards have no present interest in remedying past segregation; and these race-based student-assignment programs do not serve any compelling state interest. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. See Brief for Petitioner at 26. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 41% white and 59% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. Even after Brown, some schools with predominantly black enrollments have achieved outstanding educational results. Racial imbalance is not segregation, and the mere incantation of terms like resegregation and remediation cannot make up the difference. 4, p.86 ([Y]ou cannot talk about this problem just in a vacuum in the manner of a law school discussion), with post, at 57 (The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document). summary.aspx?schoolId=1104&reportLevel=School&orgLinkId=1104&yrs=; That plan, which took effect before 1996, is the very plan that in all relevant respects is in effect now and is the subject of the present challenge. of Ed. Because of its importance, I shall repeat what this Court said about the matter in Swann. In a searing dissent to the sharply divided 5-4 decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Federal authorities had claimedas the NAACP and the OCR did in Seattlethat Clarke County schools were segregated in law, not just in fact. Jefferson County phrases its interest as racial integration, but integration certainly does not require the sort of racial proportionality reflected in its plan. United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 749 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). The dissent makes much of the supposed difficulty of determining whether prior segregation was de jure or de facto. 1991). This plan is in place as of 2017. [Footnote 16]. Sch. As a matter of social experimentation, the laws in question must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners in Bolling v. Sharpe, O.T. 1952, No. Another 1,200 black students and 400 white students participated in the previously adopted voluntary transfer program. were race-neutral) does not indicate the decline in black achieve- The dissent finds that the school districts have identified a compelling interest in increasing diversity, including for the purpose of avoiding racial isolation. Student Choice, 1988 to 1998. 1, p.29 (It is universally held, therefore, that each state shall determine for itself, subject to the observance of the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the federal Constitution, how it shall exercise the police power . [Footnote 3]. [S]chool authorities, the Court said, have wide discretion in formulating school policy, and . After ninth grade, students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria). See post, at 6566. Just prior to the plans implementation, for example, 4 of Seattles 11 high schools were imbalanced, i.e., almost exclusively black or almost exclusively white. By 1979, only two were out of balance. By 1980 only Cleveland remained out of balance (as the board defined it) and that by a mere two students. Bd. The District contends that the first two benefits are important because public schools are responsible for developing good citizens. The groups members have children in the districts elementary, middle, and high schools, App. 2d 854 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part [*2761] and concurring in judgment), "Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 264, 399400 (1821) (Marshall, C. (Fourteenth Amendment creates rights guaranteed to the individual. This decision departs from long-standing jurisprudence on school desegregation. 618206(f)(1), as amended 2007 Ark. We construe Brown as endorsing Mr. Justice Harlans classical statement in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 539: Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens). And during the same time, hundreds of local school districts have adopted student assignment plans that use race-conscious criteria. The dissents appeal to stare decisis, post, at 65, is particularly ironic in light of its apparent willingness to depart from these precedents, post, at 3637. Prior to Grutter, the courts of appeals rejected as unconstitutional attempts to implement race-based assignment planssuch as the plans at issue herein primary and secondary schools. The plan also established Parent Assistance Centers to help parents and students navigate the school selection and assignment process. Hence, applying Grutters strict test, their lawfulness follows a fortiori. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U. S., at 2425; North Carolina Bd. In 2007, the United States Supreme Court struck down two local school board initiatives meant to reverse extreme racial segregation in public schools. In Grutter, in the context of law school admissions, we found that these types of interests were, constitutionally speaking, compelling. See 539 U. S., at 330 (recognizing that Michigan Law Schools race-conscious admissions policy promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand persons of different races, and pointing out that the skills needed in todays increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)). Justice Thomas also rejected the view advanced by the dissent that these school districts were in danger of resegregation. They contend that the children who have graduated no longer fulfill the third requirement because the parents merely sought injunctive relief prohibiting the school from using the race in admissions, not monetary damages, and consequently a favorable decision will not redress the injury to those children in any concrete way. We have many times over reaffirmed that [r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. Freeman, 503 U. S., at 494. Finally, it argues that race-neutral techniques, such as a lottery or taking into account many forms of diversity in a holistic approach, would be as effective as the racial tiebreaker. More recently, the school district sent a delegation of high school students to a White Privilege Conference. See Equity and Race Relations White Privilege Conference, https://www.seattleschools. 1, 23 (1995); A. Siqueland, Without A Court Order: The Desegregation of Seattles Schools 10 (1981) (hereinafter Siqueland); D. Pieroth, Desegregating the Public Schools, Seattle, Washington, 19541968, p.6 (Dissertation Draft 1979) (hereinafter Pieroth). Elementary schools in central Seattle were between 60% and 80% black; Garfield, the central district high school, was more than 50% minority; schools outside the central and southeastern sections of Seattle were virtually all white. of Oral Arg. Cf. For instance, students who attend Franklin and Ballard will receive metro passes rather than bus service. It is a context, as Swann makes clear, where history has required special administrative remedies. In 2000, Federal Judge John Heyburn, after finding that the JCPS school system did not need to be under a court-ordered desegregation policy, ruled that race could not be used for student assignment placement in the JCPS school system in regard to their magnet school programs. This the Constitution forbids. Ibid. Id. Simply putting students together under the same roof does not necessarily mean that the students will learn together or even interact. McDonald v. Chicago of Boston, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued an unpublished opinion holding unconstitutional a similar statute aimed at eliminating racial imbalance in public schools. But the solutions mandated by these school districts must themselves be lawful. Finally, the outcome of this case will give some perspective into how the new composition of the Supreme Court views the still controversial issue of affirmative action. This suggests that a decision against jurisdiction rather than on the merits would be a severe disappointment. In this respect, Swann was not a sharp or unexpected departure from prior rulings; it reflected a consensus that had already emerged among state and lower federal courts. ices Office, District Summaries 19992005, available at See also Hanawalt 31; Pub. This is by way of preface to my respectful submission that parts of the opinion by The Chief Justice imply an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken into account. In the Justice's 77-page written opinion he called the ruling a "radical" step away from established law that would take from communities a critical tool used for many years in the prevention of resegregation. I use the words may need here deliberately. Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they face (including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971) (emphasis added). of Boston v. Board of Education, 352 Mass. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis. Transfers may be requested for any number of reasons, and may be denied because of lack of available space or on the basis of the racial guidelines. He also chastises Justice Breyer for saying that the Court silently overruled Grutter with this case and that the method that Breyer applies to this case is that of "the ends justify the means". Furthermore, for a government unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible, the Court has required it to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. Croson, 488 U. S., at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). The specific interest found compelling in Grutter was student body diversity in the context of higher education. Ibid. The dissent claims that the law requires application here of a standard of review that is not strict in the traditional sense of that word. Post, at 36.

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